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ABSTRACT 
Uganda’s rapid urbanization, particularly in the capital city Kampala, offers new 
market opportunities for organized farmers to supply higher value produce for 
emerging growth markets such as multinational supermarket chains and fast food 
restaurants. Higher urban incomes allow consumers to shift from small shops and 
street food stalls to more formalized markets and modern food restaurants. These 
more formal market outlets provide both food safety and greater choice of produce. 
Supplying these outlets offers both higher income and improved business relations 
for farmers, but accessing these markets also requires significant upgrading in 
terms of product quality, more secure supply chains, and more efficient marketing 
and business management. To meet these conditions, farmers need to become 
organized for a marketplace that requires increased levels of bonding social capital 
to meet upgrade conditions and strengthened bridging social capital through 
partnerships with service providers and market chain actors to engage with these 
higher value markets in a long-term manner. One farmers’ association in a remote 
rural area in Southwestern Uganda has successfully sustained market links through 
sales of high quality Irish potatoes to a fast food outlet in Kampala. To meet the 
volumes, frequency of supply, and quality parameters demanded by their client, the 
farmers have had to learn a series of new skills and integrate multiple innovations 
at the technical, organizational, financial, and marketing levels, and meet many of 
the classical conditions associated with collective action based on empowerment 
through social and human capital development.   
 
This paper outlines how the use of collective action combined with strong leadership 
and an iterative market-led learning process have enabled a smallholder farmer’s 
association to supply a perishable crop to a modern food outlet market with 
stringent quality parameters. Success in this market linkage was possible through 
effective support from both development and research providers and the strong 
entrepreneurial drive from the farmer association. 
 
Keywords: Potato, high value markets, fast food, Entrepreneurial, Social Cohesion, 
innovation, quality, and competitiveness.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Improving smallholder farmer’s access to markets and business services is a 
leading policy objective for most Government in Sub-Saharan African countries. To 
achieve this goal, the Government of Uganda has developed the Plan for 
Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), which places efforts on crop productivity, 
marketing, and value addition as a strategy to increase smallholder incomes (GoU, 
2000). Over the past 20 years, the market opportunities for smallholder farmers 
have changed radically, with structural adjustment policies reducing Government’s 
involvement in the provision of inputs, marketing boards, and advisory services. In 
many cases, this has left farmers without production support or financial services 
(Poulton et al. 1998). At the same time, market dynamics have changed as a result 
of population growth, urbanization, rising consumer incomes, and increasing global 
competition (Best et al. 2005).   
In the industrialized countries of Europe, North America, and Asia, changes in 
the marketing of food products has led to a steady shift away from informal to 
formalized market channels. Standardized branded products and the use of 
efficient, integrated marketing, logistics, and financing processes characterize 
formal markets. The “rules of the game” in terms of product types, methods for 
production, processing, procurement, and payment are no longer set by producer 
groups, but by the more exacting requirements of international retail houses such 
as Carrefour, Tesco’s, and Wal-Mart.   
In the UK just four supermarket chains, Tesco, Asda, Sainsburys, and 
Morrisons, now account for up to 70 percent of all grocery sales (Queen 2006). The 
goods and services offered by these modern market chains are closely tied to the 
lifestyles of urban consumers who want year round access to high quality, 
trustworthy goods at consistent prices. These principles also apply to modernized 
food outlets, such as fast food restaurants, hotels, institutional buyers, tourism, and 
travel companies, essentially all markets where international food standards are in 
demand (Reardon et al, 2003).   
Similar trends are emerging in Eastern Africa with the arrival of supermarket 
outlets from Kenya such as Uchumi and from South Africa (Shoprite, Metro and 
Game stores), and franchised fast food outlets such as Nandos, Steers, Pizza Hut, 
and Subway. Although market share is small at this time, it is likely that these 
more formalized market actors will play an increasingly important role in urban food 
consumption.  Estimates suggest that already supermarkets control up to 30 
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percent of the food retail trade in Kenya and 55 percent in South Africa, and these 
outlets are capturing the higher end income consumers (FAO, 2003).   
For smallholder producers to take advantage of these new markets, 
particularly for high value products, research, development, and Government 
agencies are devising strategies to enhance their competitiveness. For example, the 
National Agricultural Advisory Development Service (NAADS) in Uganda is investing 
heavily in mass formation of farmer groups as a means of using social capital and 
collective action to improve the market performance of smallholder farmers.  A 
critical question for such projects is whether the NAADS approach has taken into 
account the skills and social structures required for farmer groups and their service 
providers to select the most appropriate products, technologies, and markets to 
develop profitable and sustainable enterprises to supply dynamic markets. 
Whilst there is substantial evidence indicating the benefits of collective action 
in enabling local organizations to manage common natural resources more 
effectively (Uphoff, 1996; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000; and Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2002), less attention has been given to the role of market forces on the outcomes 
of farmer-based collective action (Agrawal, 2001).  The literature suggests that 
collective action is an important factor in improving the business performance of 
large organizations such as firms as documented by Johnson et al. (2002), and 
clearly, co-operatives rely upon collective action in both input and output markets 
(Jones, 2004); however, there are few studies which show how these factors 
improve the marketing performance of smallholder farmer groups (Barham, 2007).   
This study reviews the factors that enable groups of smallholder farmers to 
engage more effectively with dynamic and higher value market opportunities. The 
findings confirm many of the collective action factors indicated in earlier studies and 
the need for “change agents” that can impart the skills required to engage with 
markets. The findings also highlight the considerable social and technical 
innovations that a smallholder farmer group needs to achieve if they are to develop 
long–term market linkages with a multinational fast-food restaurant. Whilst this 
may raise some concerns about the replicability of the process, it also underlines 
the incentives and collective purpose that long-term business relationships can 
forge.   
CONTEXT 
The Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group (NFG), which is the subject of this study, is located 
in Kamuganguzi sub-county of Kabale District. Kabale District lies in South Western 
highlands of Uganda, where over 90 percent of the population is engaged in 
agriculture.  Farmers work on average plots of 0.5 hectares, typically on steeply 
sloping valley sides.  The district receives an average rainfall of 1000 mm yr-1 and 
can grow a range of tropical and temperate products from the valley bottoms to the 
upper hillsides.  Most farmers in this area would fall below the poverty line and 
many would be considered as living in extreme poverty that is, earning less than 
$US1/ day. 
The Nyabyumba Farmer Field School Group was formed in 1998 with support 
from Africare, an international NGO. The group aimed to produce ware potatoes---
ware being the potatoes sold for retail---for sales into the local markets.  Kabale 
district is the traditional production area for Irish potatoes in Uganda due to its 
higher altitude hilltop areas, which are mainly free from potato blight.  However, 
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the rates of production per hectare were low because the quality of local potato 
stock was poor as it had not been refreshed for the past 20 years, a result of the 
neglect that has occurred in the Ugandan agricultural sector caused by the war. To 
address this issue, the farmers group started to focus their attention on the 
production of disease free seed potato production with support from the Regional 
Potato Research Network (PRAPACE) and the National Agricultural Research 
Organization (NARO).   
In 1999, the Nyabyumba potato group received additional project support, 
which enabled the farmers to establish the Uganda National Seed Potato Producers 
Association (UNSPPA). Membership of the association grew to 20 farmers, and for 3 
- 4 years, the association successfully produced seed potato. Most sales were made 
through NGOs in the Kabale district area who supplied seed to farmers at no cost. 
Increased seed potato sales led to expansion of the association, which grew to 
include six farmer groups with 120 members, 60 percent of whom were women.   
Growth in the seed potato market floundered in 2004 when demand for seed 
potato suddenly declined. This occurred for two reasons. The first was that local 
NGOs were no longer buying seed as they had already supplied their clients with 
disease free seed potato. More importantly, the farmers who were now producing 
higher potato yields based on improved seed material had oversupplied the local 
market and were unable to sell the increased volumes of ware potatoes. Therefore, 
even the more progressive farmers were unable to invest in seed.     
To re-stimulate the seed market, the farmers needed to develop new 
marketing strategies for sales of their ware potatoes. This provided CIAT 
(International Center for Tropical Agriculture) with an opportunity to work with the 
Nyabyumba Group and other service providers from PRAPACE, Africare, and NARO 
to test CIAT’s participatory approach for agro-enterprise development.   
 
2. METHODOLOGY FOR ACTION BASED MARKET RESEARCH 
CIAT’s participatory and area based approach to agro-enterprise development 
(Lundy et al, 2002) is based on the following basic steps: 
 
1. The identification and strengthening of a local interest/working group 
composed of producers and farmers associations, research and 
extension organizations, NGOs as well as any other service providers 
that may be interested in the selected market chains. 
2. The identification of market opportunities available in the target region 
or area and subsequent market chain analysis. 
3. Participatory business plan development, analysis, and the design of a 
shared strategy between market chain actors leading to the 
implementation of agro-enterprise options and strategies agreed upon 
by the actors in the previous step. 
4. The identification and promotion of relevant business development 
services to support market sustainability of the agro-enterprise / 
business. 
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The agro-enterprise approach is an iterative, participatory learning process 
that targets development oriented service providers. The aim is to build the 
“market facilitation capacity” of service providers so that they can in turn support 
the entrepreneurial needs of farmer organizations and local business development 
services operating within a defined project area / territory. The outcome of this 
investment being local organizations that are empowered to increase their market 
performance in selected market chains and be more responsive to dynamic market 
conditions.   
The attention given to working within an area or territory is to focus market 
intervention efforts on opportunities that combine physical, human, social and 
business assets, skills and priorities within a defined area. This enables the 
intervention team to work with both public and private sector partners and provides 
an opportunity for intervention strategies to target specific communities, such as 
the poor, marginalized or shocked, within a geographic area (Ferris et al., 2006). 
For this study, CIAT used an action research approach, which required 
applying the participatory methodology with the research team and then collecting 
and analyzing data as the process progressed. In most cases CIAT plays a more 
passive role so that when the partners are trained in the marketing methodology, 
they apply the process, and then CIAT undertakes a monitoring and evaluation role 
to assess changes in farmer market performance.   
In this case, the CIAT team was more actively engaged, taking the market 
research team through the major steps in the process. At each stage of the 
process, CIAT undertook informal interviews with groups and individuals, and these 
interviews were later followed up through a series of field visits to monitor progress 
over time. The following section provides a step-by-step account of how the 
enterprise process was applied, as explained in the agro-enterprise good practice 
guides, which can be found at www.ciat.cgiar.org/agroempresas/ingles/index.htm  
Market method  
Step 1. Group development and partnership formation 
 
The first step in CIAT’s agro-enterprise process aims to bring together institutions 
and agencies working within a specific project area who share a common interest in 
supporting a market led intervention process from analysis to action. This “working 
group” typically consists of a lead agency that facilitates the agro-enterprise 
process and other actors from research, NGOs, local business and producers groups 
who provide specific skills and knowledge to support the success of the process. 
The first task of the “working group” is to evaluate local resources, identify 
comparative and competitive advantages, and prepare a basic action plan for agro-
enterprise development. This plan would typically include developing a list of 
partner and local government capacity, infrastructural assets and status, potential 
client types and their location, potential product options, existing businesses and 
their competitiveness, local skills, and natural resources. An important element in 
the development strategy is to find opportunities that are suited for the poor or 
marginalized. In this study, stage 1 had already taken place: a “working group” had 
already been formed to support a seed potato initiative made up of the Nyabyumba 
Farmers’ Group, UNSPPA, Africare, PRAPACE and NARO providing product research 
support, and CIAT providing market support.   
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Step 2. Product identification and market analysis 
 
Stage 2 in the agro-enterprise process involves selecting a product and undertaking 
a rapid market chain analysis. The market opportunity identification method 
developed by CIAT (Ferris et al., 2006) was designed to assist intervention teams in 
making an objective decision on which product will provide the most suitable 
market option for investment, based on market information and investor’s criteria. 
Product selection criteria will change according to investor’s interests, assets, 
marketing skills, and market access.   
In many projects, product selection is integrated into the design phase rather 
than allowing local actors to be involved in such decisions. In the Kabale case, the 
farmer group had already identified ware (retail) potatoes as the product that they 
wanted to develop. This decision was based on two important criteria: potatoes are 
a traditional higher value product of strategic importance in Kabale district; and 
recent increases in production had oversupplied the local market, and new 
marketing strategies were required to overcome the significant fall in prices for the 
ware potatoes and to re-stimulate demand for seed potatoes.   
The second part of Step 2 was effectively the starting point for this study. To 
gain a better understanding of the market options for ware potatoes a rapid 
participatory market survey was undertaken. The study was based on gathering 
information from three sources: secondary data from the literature, primary data 
from existing farmer knowledge, and market information gathered from key 
informants in the market chain. The secondary data search focused on basic issues 
regarding the Ugandan potato sector including production levels, market price 
trends, market options, and previous market studies. This information was 
supplemented by recording local knowledge based on what the farmers could easily 
recall about market conditions, channels and quality of local service providers for 
potatoes. To facilitate this data gathering, farmers were asked to draw a basic map 
of their market chain, including the identification of production sites and links to 
market chain actors. The farmers were also asked to build on this information by 
providing production costs, sales prices, and assessments of service providers in 
the district. This process assisted the analytical team in identifying some of the 
critical points and problems within the existing market system as observed by the 
producers.   
Where information was unclear or missing, such as margins, market volumes 
and preferred market traits, these points were documented and used to prepare a 
checklist for collection of primary data. The working group planned a simple market 
chain analysis to assess the conduct and performance of actors and services 
involved in producing, handling, and selling potatoes to a range of market outlets. 
The survey was implemented by farmers with support from their market facilitator 
from Africare and market analyst from CIAT.   
 
Step 3. Business planning and enterprise development 
 
The working group used results from the market chain analysis to formulate an 
agro-enterprise business plan. The farmer group financially supported the plan, and 
therefore they were responsible for decisions on matching market options with their 
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investment capacity. In some cases, service providers will support specific aspects 
of a business plan, but it is advisable that such investments should be limited to 
planning, research, and demonstration roles rather than direct investment in the 
target agro-enterprise / business. We propose that service providers should resist 
the temptation to buy capital items and provide free services. Whilst the provision 
of assets and handouts can accelerate progress, this approach is generally 
unsustainable and distorts market linkage rather than supporting market 
engagement. If projects cannot be undertaken without additional resources from an 
external agency, options should be made that are less distorting for marketing such 
as the facilitation with access to credit for capital purchases and or co-investments. 
Service providers should avoid handouts. 
 
Step 4. Identifying and strengthening relevant business development services 
 
The final step in CIAT’s approach to agro-enterprise sustainability is to strengthen 
and in some cases to foster new business development services, in support of the 
core enterprise. These services may include rural finance, input supply, transport, 
market information, research inputs, and business relationship development.   
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group was in a weak marketing position when CIAT’s 
agro-enterprise intervention took place. The group had been working on the 
production of seed potato as a means of increasing potato productivity. However, 
their success in the input supply market had led to an oversupply in both the seed 
potato and ware markets, which had led to reduced income for their members and 
a rapid, fall in demand for their seed potatoes.   
Given this situation, it may have been assumed that the marketing strategy 
the group was to embark upon would be relatively conservative. However, the 
results reveal that the group was prepared to take on considerable risk to maximize 
gains. The marketing strategy adopted by the group required a combination of 
strong leadership, collective action, learning new skills, and investment in 
innovation to be successful. In each section of the implementation plan, investment 
and innovation were required, and although managing multiple innovations clearly 
adds risk, these changes were all based on market requirements. In this study, step 
1 and product selection have been omitted as these steps were undertaken prior to 
the intervention. The key results from the methodology were as follows: 
 
Results  
 
Step 2. Market analysis 
 
The rapid market survey identified four main marketing channels:  
• Selling potatoes into the local market; 
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• Selling potatoes into the Kampala wholesale market; 
• Selling potatoes to small shops in Kampala; 
• Selling potatoes to higher value, formal outlets such as supermarkets 
and restaurants.  
 
The study systematically reviewed the marketing channels for “ware” 
potatoes from the production site in Kabale through the marketing intermediaries to 
selected market outlets in Kampala. Kampala is the capital city of Uganda, located 
450 km from the production area. In Kampala, a number of market opportunities 
were identified including informal “wet” wholesale and retail markets, and more 
formal markets such as the Uchumi and Shoprite supermarkets, hotels, restaurants, 
and fast food chains. The analysis collated information on basic buying conditions 
including price, frequency of purchase, produce quality requirements, payment 
conditions and interest of the managers in receiving regular supplies of ware 
potatoes from the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group.  
Based on the findings from the market chain analysis, the Nyabyumba 
Farmers’ Group decided to focus on developing supplies for Nandos, a multinational 
fast food restaurant in Kampala. Nandos consumes approximately 10 metric tons of 
fresh potatoes every month. This level of purchase fell within the uppermost limits 
of possible supply by the farmers’ group but offered an opportunity to develop a 
long term, higher value business relationship.   
 
Step 3. Business planning and enterprise development 
 
Following the survey and the development of a basic production and marketing plan 
by the farmers, a business meeting was arranged in Kampala, between the 
marketing team and Nandos management to negotiate a potential long-term 
business deal. Major issues of negotiation were the volume and frequency of 
supply, the conditions for quality, including size, shape and variety, the price per kg 
over the next 6 months, and terms of payment terms. Nandos advised the farmers 
that if they produced quality potatoes at a competitive price, Nandos would commit 
to a long-term relationship, but would not tolerate low quality or irregular supplies. 
The management also expressed optimism in working with the farmers so that they 
could both grow their businesses together. 
There was no official contract signed between the farmers and Nandos, but 
the agreement laid out the following conditions that the farmers should meet: 
 
• Nandos must receive 50 bags of 100 kg from the farmers every 2 
   weeks, to provide 10 metric tons per month. 
• The farmers should not wash the potatoes before delivery, to extend 
shelf life. 
• Potato variety: Nandos required supply of only one variety, Preferred 
Victoria, or NATPOT 2. 
• Potatoes must conform to the required quality standards: large sized 
weighing approximately 80g / tuber oval shaped potatoes with few 
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eyes. These parameters were made to reduce wastage when the 
potatoes were transformed into chips. 
• Payment of Uganda Shillings (UGX) 32,200 per 100 kg payable 
($170/mt) on the 15th of each month after delivery (The average price 
at the Kampala market at that time was from UGX 25,800 – 
28,800/100kg, with local Kabale market prices at an average of UGX 
22,300 / 100kg). 
• Payment was to be made by check; to facilitate this process, the 
farmers had to open a bank account. 
 
Based on these conditions the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group with their service 
providers carried out a basic profitability analysis, which showed that the farmers 
could be profitable if they sold to Nandos throughout the year (see Table 1). All 
parties agreed upon terms, and the farmers moved to detailed enterprise planning. 
Table 1 – Profitability analysis for delivery of 50 bags of 100kg bags every 
2 weeks  
Production Costs 
Total2  
Sh/bag 
12,000  
Notes/ Assumptions 
Post-harvest handling and transport 
Grading, packing, sewing 
On-loading 
Off-loading 
Bags 
Book keeping and accounting 
UNSPPA charge 
Transport to Kampala 
Escort cost  
Rental of store Bad roads 
Sh/bag 
100 
200 
300 
500 
40 
1,000 
6,000 
800 
100  
 
2 persons for 1 day at 2500/- 
50 bags 
200/- per bag 
300/- per bag 
500/- per bag 
2 days /month for 12 months at 
2000/-1200 bags 
1000/- per bag 
6,000/- per bag 
Transport 15,000/25,000/- food 
and board per trip 
5,000/- rental / month and 
5,000/-security /month 
Sub total 
Other costs (bank fees, depreciation, etc) 
9,040 
1,808 
Bank charges, depreciation, 
minor inputs 
Total 10,848  
  Total cost 22,848  
Purchase price at Nandos / bag 32,200  
Net profit 1 bag 9,352 US$ 5.05 
   
Net profit 50 bags 467,600 US$ 252.76 
Exchange rate US$1 = UGX 1850 
A second workshop was held in Kabale where the partners assessed changes 
to be made in the production and marketing of potatoes. A visioning process was 
used to compare the current production and sales situation with the desired future 
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situation that was based on the buying conditions given by Nandos. Based on this 
participatory business planning method, detailed activities for implementing the 
potato enterprise were developed with outputs, responsibilities, time frame, and 
budget (see Table 2.)   
Table 2 – Action plan for the start-up of the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group 
potato enterprise 
Area of 
intervention 
Activities to be 
developed 
Expected outcome Actors responsible Timing 
Production Stagger planting 
schedule 
Adjust planting spacing 
practices to produce 
larger potatoes  
Train group members 
on ware potato 
management 
techniques 
Arrange for research 
on seed of identified 
varieties for Nandos 
Multiply desired 
varieties 
Identify and 
implement micro-
irrigation 
Continuous supply of 
potato 
Less rejections due to 
undersized potatoes 
Enhanced skills of 
members in ware 
potato production 
Access to improved 
potato varieties 
Sufficient seed to 
plant  
Stable quality 
production during the 
dry season 
NFG members, 
Africare 
NFG members, 
Africare, NARO 
NFG members, 
Africare, NARO 
NFG management, 
NARO 
NFG members 
NFG management, 
Africare 
July 2003 
July 2003 
Sept-Nov 
2003 
Sept 2003-
ongoing 
Oct 2003 
Dec 2003- 
ongoing 
Post-harvest 
handling 
Rent warehouse for 
potato storage 
Purchase weigh scale 
Train group members 
on sorting, grading 
and packing 
procedures 
Bulked product for 
collective marketing 
Control of sales  
New skills of 
members in post-
harvest handling 
NFG management 
NFG management 
NFG members, 
Africare 
Jul 2003 
Jul 2003 
Jul 2003-
ongoing 
Marketing  Identify, contract and 
organize transport for 
potatoes to Kampala 
Develop and maintain 
contact with 
purchasing department 
of Nandos 
Identify alternative 
market outlets for 
ware potatoes and for 
rejects 
Low costs of 
transport, and regular 
supply  
Established targets 
for delivery and 
future production  
Strengthened 
sustainability of the 
enterprise 
NFG management 
 
NFG management, 
Africare, UNSPPA 
NFG management, 
UNSPPA 
Jul 2003-
ongoing 
Jul 2003-
ongoing 
Jan 2004 
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Area of 
intervention 
Activities to be 
developed 
Expected outcome Actors responsible Timing 
Business 
organization 
Negote with Nandos 
and finalize MoU 
Register the group 
Open a bank account 
Establish a group fund 
Train leaders and 
group members on 
enterprise 
management and 
administration 
Consolidation of the 
relation producer-
purchaser 
Access to NAADS 
service provision and 
bank account 
Safe management of 
resources, access to 
payments by Nandos 
Access to credit 
Effective 
management of the 
enterprise 
NFG management,  
 
Africare, UNSPPA 
NFG management 
NFG management 
NFG management, 
Africare 
NFG members, 
Africare, CIAT 
Jun-Jul 
2003 
Jul-Aug 
2003 
Jul 2003 
Oct 2003 
Jun-Oct 
2003 
Monitoring  Establish a monitoring 
scheme in support of 
the start up of the 
enterprise 
Effective 
management and 
growth of the 
enterprise 
NFG management, 
Africare, CIAT 
Jul 2003- 
ongoing 
These meetings enabled the marketing and production teams to formulate a 
business checklist (Table 3), which highlighted the issues of quality and frequency 
of supply being critical for successful market linkages.   
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Table 3. Business checklist for Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group 
1. Marketing  
• Buyer  Primary Nandos restaurant 
• Sales targets 10 mt / month 
• Product definition 
– What is quality class (A, B, C)? 
Class A 80 80g / tuber, oval shaped potatoes, 
few eyes 
– What are the alternative markets Secondary Kampala wholesale markets 
– Packaging 100 kg Nylon sacks not washed 
– Labeling of farm produce for traceability Not required, sole supplier 
• Price 
– How will farmers / BDS be paid 
Ugs 32,200 / 100 kg sac to be paid monthly by 
check to bank in Kabale 
– Promotion (what will attract the buyer) None required 
– Distribution (what are the logistical 
needs) 
3-5 mt truck from Kabale to Kampala 450 km 
Production target 
• Production target to match sales target  
– Schedule of delivery (weekly, monthly) 5 metric tones every 2 weeks 
– Production inputs needed Seed and fertilizer, access to highland and low 
wetlands to provide continual supplies 
– Technology requirements Access to seed  
– Upgrading of production Staggered planting, irrigation, fertilizer, spacing 
– Needs in postharvest Storage facilities (already acquired) 
Financial targets 
• Capital requirements for production target  
• What needs to be available for start up USh 5 million ($2,700) 
• What is needed for operations  
• Sources of capital  
– Local 
– External (grant , loan, conditions) 
 
Group savings 2,000,000 
Required to borrow USh 3 million ($1,600) 
Profitability  
• Target profitability UGX 9,352 / 100 kg (US$ 5.06 / 100 kg) 
• Financial evaluation compared with existing Existing market price – 18,000 / 100 kg bag 
• Sensitivity of the income and costs UGX 3,752 / 100 kg (US$ 2.03/ 100 kg) 
– Where is the critical point Meeting quality parameters to gain premium 
price 
Management  
• Who does what? Detailed production to delivery enterprise plan 
• How are farmers paid Cash on monthly basis once check has matured 
• What are  incentives for farmers Long term access to premium prices 
Review process 
• Review the system every 3-6 months Market team 
• Compare targets: are they well linked Market team 
• What changes are needed Market team 
• More regular review process as product 
increases in value 
Market team 
Source: Authors 
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Step 4. Identifying and strengthening relevant business development services 
 
The enterprise business plan devised by the farmer group required access to a 
number of services. The research group was required to provide technical input into 
designing a planting schedule and spacing regime that could provide the desired 
size of potatoes. The restaurant also required a variety that provided high quality 
chipping characteristics. To address these issues Africare arranged for NARO to 
undertake a series of trials with the farmers. These trials evaluated the use of 
micro-irrigation, spacing, planting in upland and lowland fields, and staggering to 
develop a consistent size and variety testing to improve the quality of potatoes 
being sold into Kampala.   
Other services required for delivery of potatoes included transportation, 
access to finance, and communications. During this exercise, the only service 
provider that was identified for additional support was Africare, who received 
training in market chain analysis and business planning. This training was also 
given to the farmer group to increase their marketing capacity.  
 
Factors affecting successful linkage to formal markets 
 
As indicated by previous studies by Wade (1988) and Ostrom (1997), a cluster of 
social factors was important in enabling the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group to make 
the many changes required to increase their market performance. These included 
human capital development, increasing their bridging social capital,3 upgrading 
leadership skills and integrating these social changes with new technology and 
market-led innovation. Below are the key factors that contributed towards the 
success of the process of social, technical and marketing integration, which 
supported a collective response to an identified market opportunity. 
 
Quality of service provision and iterative learning 
The ability of the farmers to organize, learn new skills, and innovate was highly 
dependent upon effective and long-term support from a number of service 
providers. For several years, the farmers had received social and agricultural advice 
from Africare, and potato expertise from NARO and PRAPACE, with CIAT providing 
support to strengthen marketing skills at a later stage. All the service providers 
were involved in iterative learning processes, and this “learning by doing” 
empowered the farmer group in developing skills and management capacity, and 
helped them to strengthen shared norms, interdependence, and trust through a 
                                                     
 
3 ‘Bonding social capital’ refers to strong ties that connect family members, neighbors and close 
friends who share similar demographic characteristics. Weak ties, for example, among members of 
civic organizations such as clubs and other voluntary associations, constitute ‘bridging social capital’ 
(Gittel and Vidal, 1998). 
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series of learning experiences. The farmers built their social capital and technical 
skills over a 4-5 year period, which allowed them to rapidly link new organizational 
structures, technologies, and market opportunities together in their business 
planning process. Obviously, service providers can only pass on skills they possess, 
and, prior to the market collapse in ware potatoes, the local service providers had 
not considered marketing.   
 
Group formation and marketing capacity 
Although the capacity and competence of farmer groups to build and sustain 
complex social and market oriented networks is critical in linking farmers to 
markets (Barham 2007), few farmer groups in Africa receive basic marketing 
training. This often limits their ability to focus their investments and innovations in 
a way that capitalizes on their social strengths. A key reason for this omission is 
that traditionally, service providers were not required to build capacity in 
marketing, and when structural adjustment forced Governments to relinquish 
market control, many service providers failed to redress the imbalance with market 
support. Prior to the interventions by CIAT, the Nyabyumba farmers only received 
training in potato production through a farmer field school (FFS). FFSs typically 
consist of farmer groups that are clustered to study an agricultural technology, such 
as variety testing or integrated Pest Management (IPM) (Gallagher, 2003). Whilst 
there is evidence that FFS members have improved technology skills (Godtland, 
2004), there is little evidence to show the link between technology-focused 
collective learning and improved use of resources such as economies of scale 
translated into profit through collective market performance.   
Through the FFS, the Nyabyumba farmers had built large stocks of “bonding” 
and “bridging” social capital with respect to Africare, and NARO, but they had not 
extended their links to the private sector by strengthening their external social links 
to market chain actors. Nevertheless, the historical characteristics of the group lent 
themselves to collective marketing as the farmers had developed many of the 
positive collective action factors such as being clustered in small groups, having 
shared norms, past successful experiences, appropriate leadership, 
interdependence among group members, and homogeneous interests (Agrawal, 
2001). Interestingly, most of the group members were also members of a local 
church, which further strengthened their network (similar to the findings in 
Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002). Given this profile, the NFG was well primed as a social 
unit to acquire and use new marketing skills. They had a clearly defined goal and 
were technically experienced in potato production. The chairman of the group also 
had an entrepreneurial flare and trust within the group, which was important for 
rapid decision-making in successful marketing.   
The relationships between collective purpose, empowered leadership, quality 
of service provision, and exposure to risk are clearly important factors in improving 
the market performance of farmer groups. The information in Table 4 attempts to 
identify and prioritize these factors, as collective action may not be essential in all 
the steps towards improving market performance. Based on the views of the 
research team, strong leadership within the group was considered the most 
important factor in identifying and maintaining market links, followed by quality of 
service provision and then the collective purpose of the group members. Whilst all 
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of these factors are interrelated, this analysis suggests a hierarchy of factors that 
enable a group to improve the prospects of market success. Risk was also assessed 
to gain a sense of the risk factors associated with each marketing step and how 
they was addressed; in several cases, this group took risks that were high to very 
high. The group was able to do this successfully as they had considerable 
confidence in their capacity and the commitment to take on the risks. In many 
cases, we believe the outcomes would not have been positive, but these were 
generally collective decisions, and in this case, the governance within the group 
was strong.   
Product selection 
In this case, the product was selected at the outset of the marketing approach as 
the farmers wanted to build on their previous experience in working with potatoes. 
The main shift, however, was to re-focus efforts from seed potatoes to ware potato 
markets. Therefore, the marketing study focused on identifying market 
opportunities for ware potatoes. Specific parameters of the product as stipulated by 
the buyer were potatoes of a specific variety, size, shape, and moisture content. 
This required that farmers shift production into a new variety and change their 
agronomic practices to meet the size and moisture content conditions required. In 
situations where the product has not been selected, the agro-enterprise approach 
starts with a review of products with market potential. This stage, entitled market 
opportunity identification, is a critical part of the enterprise approach and requires 
the participation of all members of the group or community in offering ideas and 
confirming the selection of a product, based on their review of information 
generated from a market analysis. High levels of participation are required during 
this process to confirm support for a product to build the basis of a common 
purpose. Farmers must feel that they have ownership of this decision, as 
subsequent investments by the group will be based on this collective decision. 
 
Developing the market channels 
The traditional marketing of ware potato in Uganda is informal, and trading links 
are characterized by seasonal production and opportunistic sales to random local 
buyers. Typically, potatoes are harvested in July and dumped onto the local market, 
where the crop is sold in mixed grades and maturity. Farmers sell from their farms 
through brokers or into the local village markets, where they receive low prices 
(Figure 1). Much of the value in the market chain is absorbed by numerous services 
and transactions between local collectors, brokers, traders, and retailers.   
 
 
 
14 
Figure 1. Traditional potato-trading chain 
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Source: Ferris et al., 2004 
 
Through the participatory market analysis, several supply channels were 
identified and studied, each offering agro-enterprise opportunities with different 
quality requirements and price options, and the farmers decided to opt for direct 
supply of potatoes to Nandos. Nandos outlined very specific characteristics for the 
types of potato they wanted, to increase their ability to provide customers with 
quality potato fried chips.   
Of all market channel options, the supply of “chipping” potatoes to Nandos 
was the highest value and highest risk. Supplying this market also required the 
highest level of innovation to their existing production and marketing systems. The 
market channel developed between the Nyabyumba farmers and Nandos required a 
fundamental change in the focus of the group, from their existing position of 
supplying an input market as shown in Figure 2 to a new scenario of supplying an 
output market as seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Original Nyabyumba farmers market channel to supply seed 
potatoes to local NGOs 
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Source: authors 
 
In this more formalized market, the quality and supply parameters were 
stringent compared to informal market requirements. Therefore to offset this risk, 
the farmers identified alternative market channels into the Kampala wholesale 
markets, such that the produce that failed to meet the preferred market based on 
the Nandos grade could be sold rather than being discarded.   
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Figure 3. Upgraded market channel to supply ware potatoes to Nandos 
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Table 4 – The role of collective action, leadership and innovation in market linkage 
Issue Challenge Innovation / action 
Collective 
Action 
Score 
Leadership/ 
management 
Score Service 
providers 
Score Risk Score 
Group 
formation 
Development support 
requires farmer 
groups 
prior to this process 
farmer group formed 
Essential 5 Low 1 Essential 5 Low 1 
 
Market decision 
making 
Chairperson dynamic 
and empowered 
Not required 1 High 5 Essential 5 Medium 3 
Product 
selection 
Market analysis 
Participate in market 
study 
Required 3 High 5 Not required 1 Medium 3 
Channel 
selection 
Select high value 
product in high value 
market 
Participate in market 
selection process 
Required 3 High  5 High 4 V. High 5 
 
Establishment 
business relationship 
Negotiate and agree 
to contract 
Not required 1 High 5 High 4 Medium 3 
Production 
Farmers grow the 
same variety 
Select variety and 
multiply seed 
Essential 5 Medium 3 High 4 Low 1 
 
Year round supply 
required  
Stagger planting 
dates 
Essential 5 High  4 High 4 High 4 
Quality 
Farmers need to test 
variety 
Field trials established Not required 1 Medium 3 High 4 Low 1 
 
Product quality 
changes during year 
Use swamps and 
micro-irrigation in the 
dry season.  
Essential 5 High 5 Essential 5 High 4 
Market linkage 
Aggregation including 
storage and holding  
Use and rent 
available stores 
Not required 5 High 5 High 4 High 4 
 
Systematic sorting, 
grading, and 
packaging tubers 
required 
Agreement and 
establishment of new 
sorting methods 
Essential 5 High 5 High 4 Medium 3 
 Access to transport 
First random then 
mobile phone 
Not required 1 High 5 Low 1 High 4 
 
Building business 
relations 
Need to meet buyer 
regularly 
Not required 1 High 5 Medium 3 High 4 
Finance 
Required funds to buy 
initial seed 
Borrowed from Local 
lender 
Essential 5 High 5 Low 1 High 4 
 
Buyer only pay by 
check 
Set up a bank 
account with all 
members on payment 
schedules 
Essential 5 High 5 Medium 3 Medium 3 
 
Set savings / 
investment account 
Set up and registered 
a SACCO 
Essential 5 High 5 Medium 3 High 4 
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Issue Challenge Innovation / action 
Collective 
Action 
Score 
Leadership/ 
management 
Score Service 
providers 
Score Risk Score 
 
Re-invest in potato 
business 
Commitment to long 
term vision 
Essential 5 High 5 Medium 3 Medium 3 
Responsiveness 
Strengthening 
business skills and 
improve record 
keeping 
Seeking out service 
providers for key 
areas of support 
Not required 1 High 5 Essential 5 Medium 3 
 
Product volume 
insufficient 
Buy from other 
farmers.  
Not required 1 High 5 Low 1 High 4 
 
Require direct 
communications 
Purchased a mobile 
phone 
Not required 1 High 5 Low 1 Low 1 
 
Transport costs rapidly 
increase 
Farmers buy Truck Not required 1 High 5 Low 1 V. High 5 
 
Farmers hit by 
drought 
Renegotiate with 
buyer 
Not required 1 High 5 Low 1 V. High 5 
    66  101  67  72 
Score: 1- low, 5 – high (scores attributed by the research team)  
Production 
The contractual arrangement between Nandos and the farmers groups stipulated 
that farmers would supply approximately 10 mt of potatoes of a specific variety, 
size and moisture content to the Nandos restaurant every month throughout the 
year. Up until that time, the production system was based on seasonal production 
and sales of mixed variety and ungraded potatoes into the local market. Therefore, 
to shift from one harvest a year to a consistent supply of a specific quality required 
a series of changes in the production system. All the farmers who wished to be part 
of the Nandos arrangement were required to plant the same variety and use a 
specific planting density to grow tubers of the required size. To provide year round 
supply, the farmers used a combination of methods including staggered planting 
dates, planting in lowland and highland fields, the use of swamplands during the 
off-season, and storing potatoes in light diffusion stores.   
Whilst most of the these methods were effective in extending the supply 
period, the use of swamp land was found to increase the moisture content of 
potatoes, and this led to high levels of rejection by the restaurant. The farmer 
group therefore investigated the use of micro-irrigation as a means of extending 
production into the dry season and maintaining the required moisture content. 
Nandos also requested that the farmers test different varieties to determine which 
variety would have the best “chipping qualities” when fried at the restaurant.   
Although each of the changes created challenges for the farmers group, 
these hurdles were systematically resolved through a process facilitated by the 
Africare market facilitator who worked with the group to develop basic business and 
operational plans. In most cases, piloting of new technologies was undertaken first 
by the more experienced farmers working closely with the NARO research team. 
Wider adoption of the new methods was essentially driven by profit, as farmers 
selected methods that provided best returns. 
 
Product Quality 
To meet the stringent quality standards, the farmers had to learn how to sort and 
grade their potatoes as those that did not meet the Nandos grade were sold into 
the lower value wholesale markets. Failure to meet the grade was a costly exercise 
for the farmers: from July to September 2003, up to 80 percent of the potatoes 
were rejected from the primary market and had to be sold at a lower profit in the 
wholesale markets. To address this issue, all members of the farmer group were 
provided with clear guidance in quality standards, and the group worked hard to 
reduce the level of rejects. By March 2004, rejection rates were approximately 10 
percent, and by December 2004, rejection levels were consistently less than 10 
percent (Figure 4).   
 
Market linkage and collective marketing 
To supply bulked and graded produce, farmers were encouraged to produce as 
individuals, but to sell collectively. Collective production was discouraged, as this 
tends to reduce incentives and innovation. To ensure correct payment and detect 
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problems, each bag had a farmer’s code so that farmers were rewarded for volume 
and quality supplied. Rewards were not given simply for being a group member.  
 
Finance   
Investment is critical for virtually all enterprise plans in the shift from analysis to 
action, and for most farmers, poverty is often an insurmountable barrier to 
implementing new ideas. Farmers such as those in the Nyabyumba group had no 
assets that could have been used as collateral to raise funding with a bank or 
micro-finance institution, and their only choice to kick start their new business was 
to gather the required working capital through a combination of savings, borrowing 
from family and friends, and taking a loan from the local money lender. The rate of 
interest from these operators is generally high (about 40 percent per month), but 
at least the money can be made available, and often conditions for repayment are 
more flexible than from formal financial service providers. In this case, the 
moneylender was a known member of the community, and the farmers only 
required a loan to support the first 3 months of supply. Whilst the loan exposed the 
farmers to a fairly high degree of risk, this venture paid off, as Nandos paid a 
premium flat rate price for the potatoes. By October 2006, the farmers had sold 
287,425 kg of potatoes to Nandos with a value of USh 92,550,850 Shillings (US$ 
50,027) (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  Changes in income and financial losses due to rejected potatoes 
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To address the financial issue over the longer term members of the 
Nyabyumba group established a savings and credit co-operative (SACCO) in 
September 2004.  The Government was promoting this process, and therefore it 
was possible to access advice on this matter. The SACCO enabled individual 
members to save and receive loans to invest in potato production or to cover 
essential short-term needs as they awaited payment from Nandos. The advantage 
of this scheme is that loan interest is returned to the group fund, which in time will 
enable the group to have access to larger loan options or to purchase assets. For 
this savings scheme, each group member contributed at least UGX 2,000, or 
approximately US$1 per month, leading to saving of 3,500,000 Ug Shs, (US$ 
1,891) by October 2006.   
 
Innovation and Market Responsiveness 
Other important marketing skills that emerged through the collective marketing 
approach were innovation and “responsiveness” to market change.  The 
Nyabyumba farmers have proven to be extremely adept at recognizing and reacting 
to problems in production and market supply.  This required the organization to 
monitor market conditions, identify problems and then find rapid practical solutions.  
The following are examples of market responsiveness. 
 
(i) When year round rather than seasonal supply was required, the group 
immediately elicited assistance from the NARO potato experts to set up 
planting schemes and assist in investigations that led to the establishment of 
a low cost irrigation system.   
 
(ii) When funds were required, the group borrowed the start-up capital and 
then introduced group saving schemes to reduce financial costs for their 
members and increase individual financial resilience.   
 
(iii) When transport costs proved to be significantly higher than predicted in 
the business plan, the group decided to buy a truck.   
 
(iv) To maintain regular contact with Nandos and discuss changes in supply 
or demand, the chairman purchased a mobile phone. The phone proved to be 
a critical business tool in maintaining supplies and building trust in their 
business relationships.   
 
(v)  As part of the relationship building, the chairman also invited the 
manager of Nandos to visit the farmers’ village. This proved to be an 
extremely important meeting as it was the starting point in developing a 
longer-term relationship between the producers and the buyer.   
 
These changes were made at critical points in the development of the business 
model, and the decision-making was helped to a large degree by the group’s ability 
to access advice from a number of specialized service providers in their vicinity. 
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This combination of rapid assessments and access to services accelerated the 
innovation process.  However, it required strong leadership and specialists within 
the farmer group to recognize what type of help was needed, test options, and then 
engage others to take on new ideas. The information in Table 5 lists the skill 
combinations of the service providers working with the Nyabyumba Farmers’ Group, 
indicating that each of the players had complimentary skills that were all required 
as part of the social and business development process.   
 
Table 5.  Relative skills of the key service providers for the farmer’s group 
 Strong Weak 
Africare 
 
 
Access to funding to support long-term 
community mobilization, ability to form and 
foster Farmer Field Schools, build farmer 
groups, and support processes of scaling up. 
Experimentation, marketing, 
business development, links to 
private sector. 
NARO Research in potato improvement, new 
varieties, fertilizer usage, and irrigation 
methods.  Long-term support in strategic crop 
for the region.  
Limited financial resources, limited 
timeframe, and little experience 
with scaling up, no links to the 
private sector. 
CIAT – NRM Sustainable production techniques, 
participatory processes, including 
experimentation, innovation, participatory 
monitoring and evaluation, and gender 
support. 
Business development, financial 
analysis.  
CIAT agro-
enterprise 
Market analysis and basic business planning, 
and provision of tools for market evaluation. 
Sustainable production systems 
and group mobilization.  
Money lenders Provision of finances at short notice with few 
diligence requirements. 
Business advice, long-term 
business vision. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
To a large extent, the relationship between the Nyabyumba community members 
and their collective interaction with the marketplace mirrors the rise in collective 
action in Indian irrigation systems, Agrawal (2001). As the role of Government 
declined in local Indian irrigation systems, local governance structures emerged, as 
they were required to fill the management vacuum and thus enable to the people to 
maintain access to productive water assets. In Uganda, as is the case throughout 
Africa, the role of government in commodity marketing has declined rapidly as a 
result of structural adjustment, decentralization, and globalization (Ferris and 
Robbins, 2003). Given this situation, the Nyabyumba farmers, who represent a 
typical smallholder farming community in remote areas, needed to acquire new 
marketing governance structures to fill the marketing role formerly provided by 
government. The rapid and profound process of market reform that is taking place 
will require farmers throughout Uganda and Africa, even those in remote areas, to 
take on new responsibilities and learn new skills if they are to engage with dynamic 
markets.  For those more ambitious farmers seeking higher returns and wishing to 
engage with formal and higher value markets, the level of effort to reach the 
market standards is considerably higher than developing skills and plans to sell at 
local or informal markets.   
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Marketing competence 
 
For service providers, it is clear that marketplace changes will mean that virtually 
all agricultural interventions, even those that start with a basic food security focus, 
should be firmly based on market demand and that sound market analysis should 
provide the basis for all investment decisions. For service providers to facilitate 
market-based interventions, it is essential that they must have marketing 
competence and if these skills are lacking, service providers should seek 
partnerships with agencies that have marketing skills.   
 
Long-term processes and building social networks  
This study also underlines that improving the market performance of smallholder 
farmers can be a long-term process that requires a combination of social, technical, 
and marketing skills. As found in this study, empowering client groups with these 
skills requires considerable time.  Prior to the marketing support, Africare, the lead 
agency, had worked with the Nyabyumba group for 4-5 years, layering skills within 
the group.  This work started with group formation and technical learning process 
through farmer field schools.  This work built both bonding social capital within the 
farmer groups and bridging social capital through facilitating links with other 
external agencies such as NARO and PRAPACE.  Africare also introduced the 
Nyabyumba group to CIAT, who initially focused efforts on sustainable farming 
methods and gender.  The CIAT agro-enterprise team was introduced at a later 
stage in the process. We believe that one of the reasons that the Nyabyumba 
Farmers’ Group was able to take on a high value high risk market option 
successfully was a result of the previous work and experience of the group; had the 
group not gone through a long term process of experiential learning, the likelihood 
of their success would have been much lower, and they might have not selected 
such an ambitious market option.   
This supports our view that service providers should develop strategies that 
layer skills within farmer groups and facilitate the development of relevant social 
networks that support improved market performance.  To undertake these tasks we 
suggests that service providers focus on support for specific markets rather than 
simply provide general production based support.   
 
Specialized roles within groups 
The increasingly competitive nature of markets also suggests that market 
performance of farmer groups may be improved by a combination of strong social 
cohesion within the group supported by specialized roles to interact with partners 
beyond the group. Typically, farmer groups include a chairperson, treasurer, and 
farmers.  This study suggests that a fourth position could be devoted to marketing.  
Depending on the size or quality requirements of the market being supplied, this 
marketing position could be located within a farmer group or be a position that 
serves an informal cluster of groups or at an association level.   
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The need for a dedicated marketing position becomes ever more important with 
higher value markets, which carry more financial commitments and risk.  In the 
Nyabyumba case, the chairperson and one of the lead farmers were given the 
responsibility of analyzing market options, making marketing decisions and building 
business relationships. This decision to empower certain group members in 
marketing, which may not have been a conscience effort, was proven critical in 
achieving the level of “market responsiveness” required to overcome new 
challenges, which, if left untreated, would have caused the business to fail. The role 
played by lead farmers in innovation was also key to taking on new ideas quickly so 
that it did not tax the entire group in testing new ideas.   
 
Investment costs in new business options 
For any farmer group with marketing ambitions, a major hurdle is the need for 
investment capital to put an agro-enterprise business plan into action.  The advent 
of rural money transmission outlets has enabled some rural communities to 
improve their access to finances from family remittances, but such outlets are 
limited in numbers.  For the foreseeable future, many rural communities in 
developing countries will be unable to access formal credit due to the inherent risks 
and challenges related to high unit / transaction costs of rain fed smallholder 
agriculture. An interesting alternative for farmers is therefore to adopt a savings led 
approach to building capital through mechanisms such as, SACCOs, saving and 
internal loan clubs (SILCs), self-help groups (SHGs), and internal savings and loan 
groups (ISLs).  In this case, the NFG initially borrowed funds from a local 
moneylender, which worked well. However, with support from Africare, they also 
explored the option of savings and internal loan methods.  This was done to provide 
farmers with short-term access to funds for covering emergencies, or building 
resiliency, but also with a view to building investment capital for new or improved 
enterprise options, at both the individual and group levels. Although savings 
methods realize capital slowly, this approach integrates a risk limiting mechanism, 
in that farmers can only invest at the level they save.  Savings led interventions 
also mean that farmer group members learn practical financial skills and build social 
bonding and trust.  This type of financial approach allows service providers to focus 
their interventions on analysis and training or advice rather than investing in capital 
items. 
  This point however comes with the understanding that as groups take on 
more financial responsibility, the issues of governance and transparency become 
more important.  Uganda is littered with co-operatives, SACCOs, and farmer 
associations that were once successful but then failed due to financial 
mismanagement. Many of the problems in the co-operative movements are 
ascribed to political manipulation by government bodies, and, therefore, it is 
essential that groups are owned by farmers and that decisions are made by them 
(Mike Mailloux, personal communication, November 2005).  Cooperative League of 
the U.S.A. (CLUSA),4 a leading service provider that supports farmer groups and 
                                                     
 
4 Founded in 1916, the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. (CLUSA)—the international program of the 
National Cooperative Business Association (NCBA)—provides technical assistance to cooperatives, civil 
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collective action in agriculture, places considerable emphasis on democratic 
processes and self-assessment within groups, as it suggests that financial 
mismanagement is a common reason for failure of farmer groups and especially 
cooperatives.   
Innovation and profit linked to monitoring and evaluation 
In this market oriented phase, the level of innovation increased dramatically, and 
the usefulness of new ideas and their performance was based on changing income 
that is, profit, which at times was negative. The need for change was transferred 
away from the concept of testing new ideas being introduced by an external 
agency, to one of testing ideas to meet the needs of the buyer. The incentive for 
success being determined by sales levels or reduced rates of rejection.  In this case 
there was no need for a sophisticated monitoring and evaluation processes as both 
the effectiveness of the innovation system and the ability to meet the challenges of 
the market were reflected by changes in income, which was clearly a sufficient 
stimulus to focus the group on finding their own solutions and networking 
effectively with partners to introduce new ideas and put them into practice within 
their economic framework and limitations.   
 
Marketing and gender 
When taking a more business-like approach to agricultural interventions, many 
observers suggest that women may be marginalized as men seek to maximize their 
share of new profits. In this case, however, there was no evidence that women 
were either displaced or refused entry to this new market opportunity. As the 
business grew, more women were able to access this distant market through a 
well-organized market channel. The position of more women than men was further 
strengthened when the Nyabyumba farmers integrated savings schemes into their 
collective effort although this approach empowered both men and women to be 
more resilient in their financial needs.  
We conclude that the success of the Nyabyumba farmers in identifying and 
maintaining market links was based on a combination of effective service provision, 
their strong social base, collective learning, sequenced skills development, access 
to new technology, and development of social networks acquired through long-term 
support. Over the years, the lead service provider, Africare, had used several 
approaches to building group skills and social capital to form a closely-knit cluster 
of farmer’s group with an empowered leadership. The relationship with specialist 
service provider enabled the group to access new production technology, and the 
latest addition into the skills set was an emphasis on market opportunities.  Once a 
market strategy had been developed, subsequent innovations and interventions 
came rapidly and were made according to market performance.  
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This outcome highlights the importance of marketing strategies and the value 
of market linkage through collective action approaches.  For reasons of quantity 
and quality, the Nyabyumba farmers would not have been able to access this high 
value market unless they acted together.  In the future, as markets become more 
competitive and product quality more exacting, it is likely that many more market 
opportunities, particularly higher value options, will only be accessible through 
disciplined collective efforts.  
 
Health warnings on farmer groups 
However, having made these statements we have three important caveats, related 
to sustainability, silver bullets, and risk.   
In terms of success and sustainability, we note that many service providers 
measure their project effectiveness based on increased farmer income and numbers 
accessing a market.  Whilst these are important indicators, we suggest that 
projects should also consider the transfer of marketing skills as a metric to measure 
sustainable engagement with markets.  Given that project cycles tend to last for 3-
5 years and that service providers often intervene directly to support market supply 
rather than facilitate market linkages, it is often the case that farmer remain 
entirely dependent upon service providers to maintain market ties.  When the 
project ends and the service providers withdraw their support, they often 
unwittingly remove the market linkages, and farmers are unable to benefit from the 
technology skills they have learnt.  Farmers will remain vulnerable to such problems 
and to market shifts unless they learn the skills that would enable them to 
understand markets and how to identify and secure new market opportunities.  
Service providers could therefore use the transfer of marketing skills as a proxy for 
increasing the likelihood of more sustainable interventions.   
The second point is that forming farmer groups is not sufficient on its own to 
enhance market performance and is not a guarantee for increasing profit.  There 
are many situations where it is either more profitable or more convenient to sell as 
an individual rather than through a group. Collective marketing comes with many 
transaction costs and time impediments in planning and selling, and if the gains of 
selling through a group do not sufficiently compensate the producer, then it is likely 
that a collective approach will be ineffective.   
It may also be the case that collective action is only required at the moment 
of sale to provide a buyer with a minimum lot size, for example, that is enough to 
fill a truck rather than selling 2-3 bags per farmer. Understanding and monitoring 
markets and the profits gained through individuals and groups will enable service 
providers and farmers to evaluate the merits of when best to use collective action 
in the marketplace and recognize when it will not be effective, as illustrated in the 
examples in Table 6.   
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Table 6. Positive and negative effects of being in farmer groups 
Situation where collective action is effective Situation where collective action is less effective 
Where farmers can access lower cost inputs 
through bulk purchase or affiliation with larger 
member groups. 
Farmers can access inputs at competitive prices. 
Products are differentiated, and farmers receive 
premium prices for quality. 
Farmers sell undifferentiated product into local market. 
Products receive premium prices when available 
at higher volumes and/or specific grades of 
product supply. 
Markets are highly competitive, where large numbers of 
traders are actively seeking product. 
Poor farmers can only link to market by 
supporting efforts that attract larger buyers. 
Barriers to entry are low. 
Contract from buyer offers attractive 
arrangement in terms of price and continuity or 
regularity of purchase. 
Market access is easy. 
Buying company can enforce the contract. Access to services is easy. 
Farmers face poor market access. There are no market grading, standards, or product 
differentiations.  
High investment costs required to enter specific 
market, such as irrigation or storage, cold chain. 
There are no premiums on product sales. 
Only few traders operate in the area. There are no contracts for supply, or contracts cannot 
be enforced. 
Services including finance are limited in the area. Farmers coalesce rapidly for sales with need for building 
trust and skills. 
 
The third point relates to risk. Higher value products generally require 
greater investment and will expose farmers to higher levels of risk. Whilst higher 
value markets offer higher returns, it is essential that a service provider works with 
farmer groups and uses methods to match marketing skills and group competence 
with market risks. As farmer groups take on more risk, service providers should 
also place greater emphasis on developing transparent financial systems that are 
accountable to the members. Service providers should ensure that farmers are not 
encouraged to opt into inappropriately high levels of financial risk, which could 
make them significantly poorer if they are unable to meet the market standards. All 
parties in any collective arrangement should be made aware of the many problems 
associated with mismanagement and poor governance within groups that have 
financial commitments to each other. Therefore, integrity in the process and 
providing checks and balances to promote due diligence cannot be overemphasized.  
Given these caveats, we believe that marketing strategies combined with 
collective action can accelerate innovation, streamline interventions, and improve 
the efficiency of service providers in raising the market performance of poor 
farming communities. We conclude that marketing skills should be considered of 
equal importance to technology when seeking livelihood development for the rural 
poor. Similarly, when designing a project or developing new policies that support 
smallholder livelihoods, emphasis should be placed on sound market analysis and 
empowering local actors with the ability to evaluate, monitor, and be responsive to 
changing market conditions, particularly in the case of high value and more formal 
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markets. 
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